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IS INTERNATIONAL LAW RELINQUISHING ITS
EXCLUSIVELY PUBLIC LAW NATURE?
Hercules Booysen*
I. INTRODUCTION
The most basic question confronting any student of international
law is certainly, what is international law? What norms does it encom-
pass and what relationships does it govern? As we have seen through
the ages, these questions can be answered highly philosophically, elab-
orately or fundamentally. This is, however, neither the intention nor the
purpose of this article. The purpose is very simply to address the ambit
of international law. What norms should be classified under internation-
al law and should this classification be restricted to norms of a public
law nature?
Is it correct to regard international law as consisting solely of pub-
lic law norms and to describe it as "public international law?" Is in-
ternational law basically made up of norms regulating the relationships
between states? Or are there also norms which are primarily applicable
to ordinary private individuals? Is there such a thing as a "private-law
leg" of international law or should there be such a leg? According to
what criteria should norms of a private or public law nature be classi-
fied? Should one look only at the source of a norm or also at its na-
ture?
These are very basic questions of both theoretical and practical
value. The practical value can be illustrated by two examples. First,
many states have agreed to Specific Commitments, in terms of the
General Agreement on Trade in Services, to open up their markets for
legal services in "international law"' or "public international law."2 A
* Professor in Public International Law, International Trade Law and International Trans-
port Law, University of South Africa.
1. See Schedule of Specific Commitments of Switzerland, pt. 11.1 of the Sector-Specific
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person admitted to a foreign country to render legal services in interna-
tional law or public international law must know what these terms
encompass. Is there a difference between international law and public
international law? Do conventions such as the 1980 United Nations
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG),
the International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of
Law Relating to Bills of Lading of 1924 as amended in 1968 (Hague-
Visby Rules), or the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules
Relating to International Carriage by Air (Warsaw Convention of 1929)
qualify as international law?
These conventions all have their origins in public international law,
but are intended to regulate relationships between individuals. In accor-
dance with their nature, therefore, they can be regarded as falling within
the realm of private law. There are a multitude of these conventions
establishing what may be termed an international transport law, subdi-
vided into international maritime, air, road and rail transport law. In the
same vein, one may identify an international law of contracts in light of
the United Nations (CISG); and an international law of bills of ex-
change in light of the UN Convention on International Bills of Ex-
change and International Promissory Notes of 1988, the Geneva Con-
ventions on the Uniform Law of Bills of Exchange of 1930, and the
Geneva Convention on the Uniform Law of Cheques of 1931. These
examples are not exhaustive.
One should also ponder whether there can be any international law
not "public" in either source or nature. Here again the answer is not a
simple "no." The International Chamber of Commerce in Paris is a non-
governmental institution which has published two sets of rules: the
International Rules for the Interpretation of Trade Terms (Incoterms);3
and the Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits
(UCP).4 The legal force of these rules is controversial, but one may
regard them as an embodiment of custom or general principles of law
recognized by states.' The CISG also makes usage of the standard of
whether parties knew, or ought to have known (this standard is regular-
Commitments.
2. See Specific Commitments of the European Communities and their Member States, pt.
1I.1.A.a of the Sector-Specific Commitments. It is expressly stated that EC law is excluded
from public international law. See also the Australian Specific Commitments pt. I.1 .A.a of the
Sector Specific Commitments.
3. See International Chamber of Commerce, INCOTERMS 1990 (1990) (ICC Publication
No. 460), for the 1990 version of the Incoterms.
4. See International Chamber of Commerce, Uniform Customs and Practices for Docu-
mentary Credits (rev. 1994) (ICC Publication No. 500).
5. See HERCULES BooYsEN, INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS AND THE INTERNATIONAL
LAw MERCHANT 221, 237 (1995).
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ly observed in international trade by parties to contracts in the particu-
lar trade), applicable to an international contract of sale.6 The rules of
the ICC and the usage which the CISG refers to may be regarded as
'international' without the prefix "public."
In practical terms, if one is permitted to practice international law
in a foreign country, can one also practice international transport law,
international law of contracts, Incoterms, and the UCP? Whatever the
answer, one cannot argue that these norms are national or intrinsically
linked to a particular state.
Second, many constitutions regard the rules of customary interna-
tional law as part of the law of the state.7 As long ago as 1890 when
Britain still ruled the waves, the British Colonial Courts of Admiralty
Act 1890 provided that in reaching their decisions, the Colonial Courts
of Admiralty should have regard to international law and the comity of
nations! The admiralty courts enjoyed jurisdiction over issues like
salvage and collisions at sea. The ships involved in admiralty proceed-
ings were more often than not owned by private persons. Primarily
these courts had nothing to do with the relations between states. To
give meaning to any of these provisions, the definition of international
law is vital. If international law is circumscribed as a legal system
governing the relations between sovereign states,9 it can only become
relevant when these relations are affected. If neither the rights nor the
duties of a state will be affected by an issue, international law will find
no application. If, however, international law is seen as including norms
dealing with topics such as international transport law and the interna-
tional law of contracts, its relevance and municipal application will be
greatly enhanced. For example, the international law which an admiralty
6. See United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Apr.
11, 1980, art. 9(2), reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 671, 674 (1980) [hereinafter CISGI.
7. See S. AFR. CONST. (May 8, 1996) ch. II (Bill of Rights), art. 25, regarding the way in
which the German Basic law regards the general rules of public international law to be an inte-
gral part of federal law. English cases also regard customary international law as part of English
law. See also cases in DAVID J. HARRIS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 75
(4th ed. 1991).
8. Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act 1890, 53 & 54 Vict. ch. 27, § 2(2).
9. For the usual definitions of international law, see ALFRED VERDROSS & BRUNO SIMMA,
UNrVERSELLES V6LKERREcHT-THEoRiE uND PRAxms 6 (3d ed. 1984); LASSA OPPENHEIM, IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW 4 (Jennings & Watts eds., 9th ed. 1993); I.A. SHEARER, STARKE'S INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 1 (11th ed. 1994). Although the latter's definition is wider than the usual one
which includes only the relations between states, international law is still primarily regarded as
governing the inter se relationships of states. This is further borne out by the content of the
work. According to the name and content of IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW (4th ed. 1990), it is clear that public international law is a law governing the rela-
tionships between states.
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court will then have to apply will include the general principles of, or
any custom developed in, international transport law.
However, one must admit that even in municipal law the correct
sphere of application for a specific branch of law cannot always be
precisely determined. In the South African case Reck v. Mills0 it had
to be decided whether part of a sea wreck could be removed. The court
of first instance applied the Roman law which pertains to the ownership
of wild animals to the facts. The appellate court decided the relevant
rules were those protecting the possession, but not the ownership, which
a person enjoys in respect of a thing. The applicable law, however,
should have been the rules relating to salvage."
The correct description of a subject should, of course, not only
depend on its practical relevance. From a purely jurisprudential point of
view, it is important to describe a subject correctly. How a subject is
described academically may influence court decisions although the law
does not necessarily find its practical application in jurisprudential
demarcations and subdivisions. Certain norms exist and function effec-
tively in practice although legal science neither describes nor classifies
them correctly-if it does so at all. For example, the rules governing an
agreement between the State of New York and Gauteng, a province in
South Africa, can possibly be found in what is described as public
international law's treaty law (although neither of the entities possesses
treaty capacity), or in one of their laws of contract, or in a book on
constitutional law, or even in administrative law. Such an agreement is
not easily classified with the result that the governing legal norms have
not yet crystallized into one of the established branches of jurispru-
dence.
II. THE NEED FOR A PRIVATE-LAW LEG OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. General
Just because a need exists, does not mean that the law already
contains the norms to govern it. Although a need does not necessarily
create the law, this in fact very often happens in international law
where there is no legislature to create the required norms. Although
there is no legislature which can be petitioned for legislative action,
there is also no need to wait for such action.
There are certain specific areas of the law where it is clear that a
need for an international private-law leg of international law has al-
ready been identified. Sometimes adequate norms to address that need
already exist in practice, although jurisprudence may not necessarily
10. Reck v. Mills, 1990 (1) SA 751(A).
11. See Hercules Booysen, Die toepassing van die wisselwet om vaderskap te bepaal en van
die Romeins-Hollandse Reg op berging, 53 THRHR 595 (1990).
[Vol. 4:219
NATURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
have kept pace by describing the norms. In other instances, the need for
a universal private law has been identified although the norms still
appear to be lacking. It is possible to refer to only a few of these areas.
The following examples involve situations where no particular
national law should, or can, govern the relations between non-state
entities, and where these relations transcend national borders. In other
words, we are investigating international relations which are unmistak-
ably private in nature.
B. Participants in International Law
1. Multinational Corporations
The international role of big trading companies is not a phenome-
non of the twentieth century. Even in the epoch of modern international
law, which is usually traced back to the beginning of the seventeenth
century, commercial interests dominated the development of internation-
al law. 2 Commercial companies played a decisive role during the colo-
nial period of international law with many countries actually being
colonized by commercial companies. In the United States, chartered
British companies like the London Company, the Plymouth Company,
and the Hudson Bay Company, played an important role in the coloniz-
ing process and exercised political and administrative powers far be-
yond those of a mere commercial enterprise. The same was true of the
General Chartered Dutch East India Company, which actually began the
colonization of South Africa. 3 These companies which existed in virtu-
ally all European Colonial powers, were actually endowed with sover-
eign power.14 Their legal position in the international law jurispru-
dence of the nineteenth century was controversial and has not yet
been finally established. 6
In the latter half of the twentieth century, the international commu-
nity turned its attention to the legal position of multinational corpora-
tions. The General Assembly's Charter of Economic Rights and Duties
of States'7 confirms the rights of states to control multinationals in
their territories, and actually embodies an obligation on the multina-
tionals not to intervene in the internal affairs of a host state,' 8 thereby
recognizing their importance in international law. The limitations placed
12. See WILHELM G. GREWE, EPOCHEN DER VOLKERRECHTSGESCHICHTE 343 (1984).
13. Id. at 349.
14. Id. at 350.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 345.
17. Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., U.N. Doc.
A/RES/3281 (1975), reprinted in 14 I.L.M. 251.
18. Id., art. 2.2(b).
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on states by the principle of territoriality mean that it is not easy or
always practical for individual states to control the activities of multina-
tionals. It is therefore recognized that international law is in need of
rules transcending the territorial sovereignty of states which can effec-
tively govern the day to day activities of multinationals. 9 Although
there are codes of conduct constituting "soft law" for the regulation of
multinationals,' the need appears to be for legal norms with a more
precise application.
When seen as a confined system of public law norms, international
law evinces serious jurisprudential problems in explaining the legal na-
ture of codes of conduct. The most obvious problems are the lack of
so-called international legal subjectivity on the part of multinationals,
and the fact that they are addressed directly by the various codes of
conduct. How is it possible for multinationals to be addressed directly,
if they are not subjects of international law? After all, only states and
organizations made up of states can be subjects in terms of traditional
jurisprudential theory." This jurisprudential problem exists irrespective
of whether or not the codes of conduct are regarded as embodying
binding law. It is only when one adopts the view that the codes are pro
non scripto and, therefore, totally irrelevant as far as multinationals are
concerned, that the jurisprudential problem disappears. This, however, is
a conclusion few publicists are likely to draw. Simply categorizing the
codes of conduct as "soft law" does not resolve the problem as it is not
the non-binding nature of the codes that must be explained, but the fact
that within the bounds of traditional jurisprudence, the addressee cannot
be addressed.
However, the real issue is whether jurisprudence, which is nothing
other than the science of law, does not describe the law incorrectly. If
international law is seen as a wider concept embracing international law
rules of a private law nature, the jurisprudential problem is resolved.
Actually, international law is shedding its public nature and is becom-
ing directly applicable to non-state entities. The legal norms, although
still public in origin, are of a private nature.22 Basically, we are con-
cerned with norms that should be classified under the international lex
19. See IGNAZ SEIDL-HOHENVELDERN, CORPORATIONS IN AND UNDER INTERNATIONAL
LAW 13 (1987).
20. See the discussions in LEGAL PROBLEMS OF CODES OF CONDUCT FOR MULTINATIONAL
ENTERPRISES (Norbert Horn ed., 1980).
21. See Hans W. Baade, The Legal Effects of Codes of Conduct for Multinational Enter-
prises, in LEGAL PROBLEMS OF CODES OF CONDucT FOR INTERNATIONAL ENTERPRISES, supra
note 20, at 8.
22. See Norbert Horn, Codes of Conduct for MNE's and Transnational Lex Mercatoria: An
International Process of Learning and Law Making: in LEGAL PROBLEMS OF CODES OF CON-
DUCT FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES, supra note 20, at 45, and particularly at 52.
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mercatoria3 because they are directly applicable to non-state entities.
Alternatively, one can say simply that we are dealing with a private-law
leg of international law. If one wishes to be still more precise: an inter-
national company law is developing.
2. Banks
If we remove the role banks play in international trade law, this
law and the international trade on which it is based will simply cease to
function. Banks play an important role in financing international sales
agreements and in bridging the gulf of mistrust between unknown buy-
ers and sellers located in different countries." They form the payment
mechanism in international sales agreements. Through private banks,
foreign exchange contracts are concluded.' Because money is regard-
ed as a medium of exchange created by virtue of a state's sovereign-
ty,' banks actually fulfill delegated state functions whenever they
exchange one country's currency for that of another. In its ultimate
theoretical analysis, such a transaction is between states exchanging one
state document, money, for another. However, the public nature of this
type of transaction has disappeared. If banks, therefore, devise and par-
ticipate in international clearing systems,' we have systems and
transactions that can be classified as falling within the ambit of an in-
ternational banking law. Cross-border banking activities are on the
increase' although the international legal problems accompanying
such activities do not always seem to be realized by the banks them-
selves.2
The existence of an international banking law is also borne out by
the UCP which apply to the relations between banks located in different
states. In this instance, of course, the rules emanated from a private
source, the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris. In this re-
spect, therefore, they differ from private law norms contained in con-
ventions like the CISG. They can only be described as international law
without the prefix public. Although I do regard the UCP as having legal
force as general principles recognized by states,3" jurisprudentially
23. Id. at 59.
24. See BOOYSEN, supra note 5, at 233.
25. See generally NICHOLAS L. DEAK & JOANNE CELUSAK, INTERNATIONAL BANKING 13
(1984).
26. See HuGO J. HAHN, WAHuNGSRECTrr 15 (1990); F.A. MANN, THE LEGAL ASPECTs OF
MONEY 3-30 (1992); A. NUSSBAUM, MONEY IN THE LAW-NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL 11
(1950) ; BOOYSEN, supra note 5, at 342.
27. See ULF R. SIEBEL, MIcHAEL PRINZ zu L6WENSTEIN & ROBERT FINNEY, GERMAN
CAPITAL MARKET LAW 27 (1995).
28. See Ross CRANSTON, LEGAL ISSUES OF CROSS-BORDER BANKING 109 (1989).
29. See F.R. RYDER, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL BANKING 58 (1987).
30. BOOYSEN, supra note 5, at 237. See also Mark A. Wayne, Note, The Uniform Customs
1997]
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their legal force is not a prerequisite for considering them part of a
developing international banking law. Without a knowledge of the UCP,
one can hardly comprehend how modem private international transac-
tions are executed. Even if these rules are regarded as being without
objective legal force, they form a kind of dispositive law, i.e., regulato-
ry law, which can be selected by the parties to govern their agreement.
These rules are more than mere contractual terms; their selection brings
with it a wealth of legal interpretation and international precedent.
3. Individuals
Public international law recognizes that individuals can incur crimi-
nal liability in terms of the laws of war and humanitarian law." This
was one of the few instances where international law has recognized
that to be effective the state's corporate veil must be lifted to make
individuals directly responsible for their acts. The deduction has already
been made from the international concern and conventions in respect of
human rights that international law is in the process of changing its
character as an interstate legal system.32
Although states participate in international trade, after the fall of
communism this has become the exception rather than the rule. In in-
ternational trade law states' primary function is regulatory. The
GATT33 and the GATS34 are clearly based on the presumption that
individuals are the primary players in international trade.
International trade law is based on the supposition that individuals
will act internationally. If they do not act, the public international law
and Practice as a Source of Documentary Credit Law in the United States, Canada and Great
Britain: A Comparison of Application and Interpretation, 7 ARIz. J. INT'L. & CoMP. L. 147,
167 (1989).
31. See Secretary-General's Report on Aspects of Establishing an International Tribunal for
the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian
Law Committed in the Former Yugoslavia, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993), reprinted in 32 I.L.M.
1159, 1175 (1993). See also Weston D. Burnett, Command Responsibility and a Case Study of
the Criminal Responsibility of Israeli Military Commanders for the Pogrom at Shatila and
Sabra, 107 MiL. L. REv. 71, 77 (1985); Theodor Meron, International Criminalization of Inter-
nal Atrocities, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 554 (1995); Theodor Meron, War Crimes in Yugoslavia and
the Development of International Law, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 78 (1994).
32. See C. Flinterman, EMH Hirsch Ballin Wereldburgers: personen in het internationale
recht, 4 RM THEMIs 139 at 140 (1996).
33. See Article XVII on state trading enterprises which makes it clear that the state, trading
through its state trading enterprise, is the exception and should in any case adhere to the normal
international business practices established for private traders. These provisions of GATT can
be found in 1 BAsic DOCUMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAw 9 (Stephen Zamora &
Ronald A. Brand eds., 1990).
34. See, e.g., the definition of 'trade in services' in article 1(2) of GATS, Final Act Em-
bodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations Marrakesh, Apr.
15, 1994.
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framework created by states will be meaningless. In this sense, the
position of the individual in international trade law is fundamentally
different from its position in conventional public international law.
Because the individual is the principal actor in international trade law,
its actions can and should create international law. Individuals can
choose the CISG to apply to their international contracts in spite of its
inapplicable provisions.35 They can also exclude the operation of the
CISG.36 If individuals were to create a practice of consistently exclud-
ing the application of the CISG, they would ultimately render this pub-
lic international law document without any effect. Reference has al-
ready been made to the fact that the CISG recognizes the binding effect
of usage created by individuals, and that this usage applies to interna-
tional contracts.37 This is clearly a recognition of the law-creating ef-
fect of individual activity on the international level.
From a legal perspective, the position of the individual is no dif-
ferent from that of a bank or multinational corporation. They are all
private law persons and non-public law entities. One must realize that
these entities cannot operate on the same level as states. To say that the
individual cannot be a subject of international law because it cannot
conclude treaties38 or appear before the International Court of Jus-
tice,39 is a non sequitur. It only means that the individual cannot act
on the same level as the state, and this is precisely the point. It acts on
a lower level, namely what is known as the private law level. Any cus-
tom emanating from its international activities, is thus on this level.
C. Subjects in Need of International Private Law Regulation
1. The International Law Merchant
From the discussion of the players in the international sphere, it is
clear that an international law applicable to individuals does in fact
exist. This law has been given the name of the international lex merca-
toria, that is, the international law merchant, and encompasses the inter-
national private law norms to which reference has already been made.
The existence of such a law has been canvassed in various publica-
tions' and it is unnecessary to repeat what has been said in this re-
35. See VON CAEMMBRER & SCHLECHTRIEM, KOMimNTAR ZUM EImnrrHT EN UN-
KAuFREcHf 85 (1990).
36. See CISG, supra note 6, art. 6; VON CAEMMERER & SCHLECTRIEM, supra note 35, at
79.
37. See CISG, supra note 6, art. 9.
38. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1980, art. 1.
39. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 34(1).
40. See Die internationale lex mercatoria: Das Erfordernis ihrer Umgestaltung zu einer
rechtswissenschaftlichen Synthese und ihr Verhltnis zum VdIkerrecht, 30 ARCMV DES
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gard. Suffice it to say that although the existence of such an interna-
tional law merchant can be traced back to the maritime law of the
Middle Ages and even further to Roman times, it remains a controver-
sial concept. In a statute like the Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act of
1890, a reference to international law could conceivably have been
intended to include the international maritime law developed from
Roman concepts by the maritime nations of Europe. After all, the law
merchant had been called the private international law of the Middle
Ages.4 This law has resurfaced after its demise in the face of the
emergence of the national state and the resultant nationalistic
codifications during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Two di-
verse, but up to the minute, manifestations of the emerging international
private laws are the European Union and the internet.
2. A Common Private Law for Europe
Even among the critics of the international law merchant, it is
conceded that some of the private law systems in Europe are facing a
measure of internationalization.42 The idea of a Europe without borders
seems to be irreconcilable with strong nationalistic private law
codifications. On the one hand, a solution is sought in a European codi-
fication embodying the best from the different national systems.43 On
the other, the universal private law based on Roman law principles
which existed from the Middle Ages until codifications rendered it
obsolete, has begun to emerge as the glittering star which should not
only lead the modem Westerner back to its cultural origins, but also
offer a possible solution." As Reinhard Zimmermann has said of the
task of creating a new European legal tradition, "[t]his venture, whether
undertaken by means of legislation or legal science (and legal training!)
would be doomed to failure if one were to lose sight of the common
historical foundations of European private law."'45 But, at the same
VOLKERRECHTS 196 (1992); Volkereg en sy belang vir privaatregtelike verhoudings 15 OBITER
95 (1994); Vlkerrecht als Vertragsstatut internationaler privatrechtlicher Vertrige, 59 RABELS
ZEITSCHRIFT FOR AUSLANDISCHES UND INIERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 245 (1995); INTERNA-
TIONAL TRANSACTIONS AND THE INTERNATIONAL LAW MERCHANT, chs. 1 & 2 (1995). See
also, Friedrich K. Juenger, American Conflicts Scholarship and the New Law Merchant, 28
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 487 (1995); Patrick J. Borchers, The Internationalization of Contrac-
tual Conflicts Law, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 421, 442 (1995).
41. See FREDERIC R. SANBORN, ORIGINS OF THE EARLY ENGLISH MARITIME AND COMIER-
CIAL LAW 125 (1930).
42. See Otto Sandrock, Das Privatrecht am Ausgang des 20. Jahrhunderts: Deutschland-
Europa- und die Welt, 51 JURISTEN ZEITUNG 1, 4 (1996).
43. Id. at 7. See also Reinhard Zimmermann, Konturen eines Europaischen Vertragsrechts,
50 JURISTEN ZEITUNG 477 (1995).
44. See Reinhard Zimmermann, Das romisch-kanonische ius commune als Grundlage
europaiseher Rechtseinheit 47 JURISTEN ZErroUNG 8, 20 (1992).
45. See Reinhard Zimmermann, Roman-Dutch Jurisprudence and its Contribution to Euro-
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time, this solution has been regarded as inadequate because the old
European jus commune is seen as a system which catered for an agrari-
an community,' ill-suited to the needs of a modem industrialized Eu-
rope.
The principles of Roman law as expounded by Dutch jurists had a
profound influence on European common law.47 These Roman-Dutch
law principles not only survived the European national codifications,
but were actually adapted to modem circumstances. As a result of a
multitude of circumstances, some of them rather idiosyncratic, the prin-
ciples did not survive in Europe but they did on the southern tip of
Africa where Roman-Dutch law was, and still is, the common law of
South Africa.' One can expect that in view of the changes gripping
South Africa, especially a deliberate process of Africanization, the exis-
tence of Roman-Dutch law in South Africa will come under severe
strain. The time has perhaps arrived for the foreign child, raised and
nurtured with such passion in South Africa over more than three centu-
ries, to be handed back to its natural forbearers where there is a need
for a legitimate blue-blooded off-spring to manage and keep together
the enlarged estate.
Roman-Dutch law and the international law merchant share the
same background. They are based in Roman law; survived the Middle
Ages; were subsequently developed by jurists;49 lost their importance
with the national codifications; and are being rediscovered by jurists
and thus by jurisprudence because of the needs of a world drawn closer
and made smaller by modem technology.'
The fact that Europe is in need of a European private law does not
mean that this European private law must now also be regarded as an
international or a universal private law. It is merely a corroboration of a
trend in the international community manifesting a quest for a private-
law leg of international law. A return to the European jus commune as
the basis of an international private law is also not feasible in today's
all-embracing international community. International law has long shed
pean Private Law, 66 TUL. L. REv. 1685, 1721 (1992) (footnotes omitted).
46. See Fritz Rittner, Das Gemeinschaftsprivatrecht und die europiaische Integration, 50
JURiSTEN ZErrTUNG 849, 854 (1995).
47. See Zimmermann, supra note 45, at 1711.
48. See WOUTER DE VOS, REOSGESKIEDENIS 226 et. seq (1992).
49. See BOOYSEN, supra note 5. at 40, for a history of the international law merchant. On
the development of the Roman-Dutch law see DE VOS, supra note 48, at 51; J.C. DE WET, DIE
OU SKRYWERS IN PERSPEKTIEF 57 (1988); J.W. WESSELS, HISTORY OF THE ROMAN-DUTCH LAW
95 (1908).
50. See also, The Rt. Hon. Lord Howe of Abervon, Globalising the Law, 23 INT'L BUS. L.
338, (Sept. 1995); Whitmore Gray, Globalisation of Contract Law: Rules for Commercial Con-
tracts in the 21st Century, NEW ZEALAND L. J. 52 (1996).
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its European exclusivity, and rightly so. What one is simply saying, is
that international law can benefit generally from drawing on the experi-
ence of Europe in fulfilling the quest for a private-law leg of interna-
tional law. If Europe were to get its European private law, this law
would simultaneously constitute international law's regional private-law
leg. In this sense, it would naturally influence the development of any
universal private-law leg.
One should bear in mind that from an international law perspective,
we are not talking about a uniform, universally applicable private law.
International law is based on the existence of different sovereign states
with different legal systems. What is required, are the legal norms to
govern only the international legal relations of persons other than states
or public international law organizations. A European jus commune will
simply provide some general principles to fill the void in the private-
law leg of international law. Like the civil law in early American law, a
European jus commune can play a role in the jurisprudence (i.e. legal
education) when there is a void in conventional international private
law, when fundamental principles of justice are at stake, or when cor-
roboration of the existence of a norm is sought.
5
'
3. The Internet
Legal control of the internet is one of the newest problematic is-
sues in international law.52 The internet is international and its legal
regulation cannot be achieved by any single country. At the moment its
legal regulation reminds one of the chaotic situation which existed in
air traffic before the private-law aspects were regulated by international
conventions. Under the territorial principle, particular states have the
power to regulate certain aspects of the internet. However, such regu-
lation will almost always have an effect in other countries giving rise to
the typical problems of extraterritorial and conflicting legislation. What
we really need is an international system directly applicable to private
persons. It is, therefore, no wonder that the international law merchant
has already surfaced as a possible applicable law and solution to the
multiple-jurisdiction problem. 3 The international law merchant appears
as a possible solution because it is perhaps the most widely recognized
law with an international nature, but which applies directly to individu-
als engaged in transborder activities. However, for the internet, a pri-
51. See R.H. Helnholz, Use of the Civil Law in Post-Revolutionary American Jurispru-
dence, 66 TuL. L. REV. 1649, 1664 (1992).
52. See Joel R. Reidenberg, Governing Networks and Cyberspace Rule-Making, 45 EMORY
LJ 911 (1996); Matthew R. Burnstein, Conflicts on the Net: Choice of Law in Transnational
Cyberspace, 29 VAND. J. INT'L L. 75, (1996); Jeremy Landau & Theodore Goddard, Defama-
tion and the Internet, INT'L MEDIA L., Oct. 1995, at 75.
53. See Bumstein, supra note 52, at 109.
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vate law with an application wider than that of the traditional law mer-
chant is most probably needed - an application which will also cover
such topics as libel and injuriae, not usually regarded as part of the law
merchant.
III. CONCLUSION
It has been shown that the concept of international law is not as
certain as one has been inclined to accept. The prefix "public" does not
clarify international law as it may still encompass norms which are
private law in nature, but which originate in public international law.
As we approach the close of the millennium, international law is no
longer a law of peace and war, or solely of public law: it has become a
true system of law with branches like those of any municipal system. It
is a system with its public law norms, its commercial norms, its private
law norms, its criminal norms, and even its procedural norms.' Like
any norms in a "regular" legal system, these norms apply to all persons,
individuals and corporations alike, and to the state. The fact that juris-
prudentially international law is not so described, is a flaw in jurispru-
dence rather than in the legal system. The jurisprudence of international
law has, therefore, to a certain extent fallen behind the positive devel-
opment of the law.55 If one accepts this exposition, the solution lies, of
course, with the universities teaching international law in its totality,
and not in terms of a meaning attached to it in a bygone era
characterized by the emergence of the national states with their all-em-
bracing commercial and private law codifications.
54. John A. Spanogle, The Arrival of International Private Law, 25 GEo. WASH. J. INT'L
L. & ECON. 477, 520 (1991).
55. See Juenger, supra note 40, at 500.
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